Metaphysics
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Table of Contents
Part I - Propositions, Rules and Logic
Fundamental Theoretical Propositions
The Rule of Causality
The Logic of Rules, Judgments and Concepts
The Principle of Sufficient Reason
The Rule of Constraint
Part II – Ontological Expositions
How Matter, Space, Motion, Time and Existence are to be Tentatively Defined
Exposition of Matter
Exposition of Space
Exposition of Motion
Exposition of Existence
Exposition of Time
Zeno's Paradoxes of Motion
Exposition of Energy
In Progress:
Part III - Epistemology
Division I - Transcendental Metaphysics
Kant's Arguments for the Certainty of Knowledge
Outline of Hume's Refutation of Kant's Transcendental Metaphysics
Division II - Mathematical Concepts
Concepts and Judgments
Kant's Concepts of Epistemology
Mathematical Concepts
Why A Priori Synthetic Judgments are Certain to be True
The Nature of A Priori Synthetic Judgments
A Priori Synthetic Judgments Do Not Yield New Knowledge
The False Identification of
Non-Physical Mathematical Concepts with Given Concepts
The False Identification of Physical Mathematical Concepts with Given Concepts
Division III - Refutation of Transcendental Knowledge
Refutation of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic
Refutation of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic: Space
Refutation of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic: Time
Summary of the Results of the Refutation of the Transcendental Aesthetic
Division IV - The Nature of Objects
Kant's Proposition of the Thing-In-Itself
The Idealism of Berkeley
Kant's Mediation of the Idealism of Berkeley
Formal Presentation of Kant's Mediation of the Idealism of Berkeley
Division V - Philosophy of Mind
Mind as Immaterial Substance
Apparent Sufficient Reason for the Identification of Mind with “Immaterial Substances”
Refutation of Hume's Immaterialist Theory of Mind
Refutation of Any Immaterialist Theory of Mind: Introduction
Refutation of the Mentalist Proposition
Refutation of the Dualist Proposition
Refutation of any Immaterialist Theory of Mind
The Possibility of Identifying Mental Experience with Given Concepts
Theories of Mind and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
The Impossibility of a Materialist Theory of the Mind
Division VI - Objective Knowledge and Reality
The Proposition of the Thing-In-Itself
The Thing-In-Itself and the Transcendental Aesthetic
The Thing-in-Itself and the Transcendental Logic
The Consequences of Mind as Immaterial Substance in Kant's Epistemology
Absolute Idealism: The Consequence of Kant's Proposition of the Thing-In-Itself
Refutation of Kant's Proposition of the Thing-In-Itself
The Necessity of a Logical Connection Between Objects Themselves and Appearances
Objective Verification
Division VII - Refutation of Kant's Transcendental Logic
Division VIII - Summary of Results
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